The Paradox of Wealth | The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social...

Taking "The Logic" Cross-National | The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities | Mancur Olson

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	• The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities Mancur Olson Yale University Press, 1984 - 276 pages average customer review:based on 13 reviews view larger image
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highly recommended

Not totally bad book, but its thesis is somewhat simplistic

This one-idea book by late professor Olson tries to explain why some countries did better than others in terms of economic growth after World War II - namely Germany and Japan, in contrast with Britain. His explanation is that World War II weakened many institutions in those two countries that, by trying to retain their usual privileges, were holding back economic progress. The weakening of those institutions, permitted the economic miracle in both Germany and Japan. In contrast, England's institutions were not as weakened, so they continue to slow England's progress. I suppose that there are grains of truth in Olson's explanation - though if it was true, then the required policy recommendation would be that is good to suffer a devastating war every once in a while. I think Olson omits another possible explanation: the fact that Germany and Japan had both a strong industrial base before the war, a base that was not completely destroyed by it. Britain was in the 1940s suffering a slow economic decline in its industrial base - which really come back from the late 19th century, when Germany overcome Britain as Europe's leading industrial and economic power. And how would Olson had explained that after he wrote the book (in 1982), Britain went through a much higher economic growth than Germany and Japan - without the intervention of a war. So, while the book is interesting to read, I think its thesis is way too simplistic.

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The Paradox of Wealth

Most people recognize that there is something wrong about special interest groups. While most people think of special interest groups in terms of fairness, Olson examines efficiency issues. Special interest groups, or distributional coalitions, hinder economic growth in industrialized nations. Special interest groups slow the pace of change in industry. We will reorganize production and adopt new technologies more slowly as more coalitions form for the purpose of transferring wealth.

Distributional coalitions are mainly a problem of wealthy nations. Paradoxically, poor nations can experience strong growth due to the fact that they have little to redistribute. Poor nations can therefore develop rapidly. The examples of postwar Japan and Germany fit Olson's thesis well. Japan and West Germany were devastated and left poor by the War, but developed rapidly afterwards. As Japan and Germany became affluent, distributional coalitions formed to retard further economic development.

Olson does not explain the stagnation of so called third world nations. Why is it that Japan and Germany were able to "take advantage" of their postwar poverty, while many other nations remain "too poor" to support extensive distributional coalitions? Distributional coalitions actually abound in poor nations. The Rise and Decline of Nations does not explain all of history, but this is definitely part of the formula. Its examples are a little dated, but there is some great stuff here.

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Taking "The Logic" Cross-National

Olson seeks to explain why some nations achieve high rates of economic growth while others suffer bouts of stagflation. He contends that the number and strength of "distributional coalitions," coupled with the length of economic and political stability will influence a nation's rate of economic growth. As such, Olson's hypothesis is two fold. First, Olson argues that states with lower levels of "distributional coalitions" often have higher rates of economic growth. Second, states which have experienced prolonged periods of disorder or armed conflict will have lower numbers of interest-group, or collusion organizations.

Olson's explanation builds upon his early work in The Logic of Collective Action, which holds that "...large groups, at least if they are composed of rational individuals, will not act in their group interest" (18). Rather, the rational actor will seek to further his or her self-interest, and will subsequently free-ride when possible. Olson expands the scope of this logic to encompass not only the rationality of the individual, but the rationality of the firm in explaining The Rise and Decline of Nations.

As the power of the firm expands, the firm seeks to maximize its own utility at the expense of a societal common good. In order to simplify a complex argument, we can think of Olson's theory in this way. An organization or firm will not expend its energy to create a benefit to society writ large, as it, and its members, will only receive a fragment of that benefit in relation to the costs incurred. On the other hand, if the same firm seeks to maximize its utility, it will seek to obtain a larger slice of the social "pie." In so doing, it may lower the benefits of society as a whole, but will significantly expand its own gain and that of its members. Meanwhile the firm will only incur a fraction of the costs such action projects on society at large. As such, Olson writes, "The great majority of special-interest organizations redistribute income rather than create it and in the ways that reduce social efficiency and output" (47).

Olson argues that a society with long-term stability - free from war, and economic and political turmoil - tend to accrue more special-interest and collusion groups. This occurs because it takes time and reasonable amount of stability for such interest-groups to organize, solidify, and begin to achieve some collective benefits for their members. Once collective benefits are seen as the result of organization, a host of other interests will begin to coalesce and seek to obtain gains for themselves. What emerges is a highly pluralistic society.

This leads us to the second part of Olson's hypothesis, those nations with high numbers of special-interest or collusion groups have lower levels of economic growth. Olson writes, "Distributional coalitions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and they reduce the rate of economic growth" (65). First, distributional coalitions stymie technological adoption when such innovation stands to benefit a rival group. A present day illustration can be found in a labor unions vehement opposition to the implementation of labor saving machinery. Second, distributional coalitions will attempt to block policy initiatives that change the status quo. When policy needs to be developed to increase economic or social advancement, the special-interest groups are likely to feel a certain displacement and will act to prevent such policy. According to Olson, these actions, coupled with others, often lead to policies which promote policies which have the potential to stifle economic growth.

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On the Virtues of Flexibility

I had always wanted to read this book and am glad that I did !

On the one hand the argument is quite obvious and one is left wondering what is really novel in this work (virtues of competition, market flexibility etc.), but I found the last chapter to be an interesting perspective on the effect of imperfect competition on the impact of changes in nominal demand on employment and inflation.

Olson explains social rigidities ,with all their negative collective effects, as the outcome of rational microeconomic behaviour and integrates these into macroeconomic theory (other mainstream macroeconomic theory attribute price rigidity to error or simply make ad hoc assumptions on wage rigidity).

This is a very valuable and important contribution to macroeconomics and explains why some economies are more resiliant than others. The main message is that governments must either make their economies more flexible or have to rely on macroeconomic conditions not fluctuating too much for acceptable macroeconomic performance.

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Why isn't this book more famous?

Olson's book is difficult to classify, since on the one hand, it's not for the general reader, but on the other hand not so forbiddingly dense that it should be classified as scholarly. Lemme put it this way: it's for economically literate people. It makes use of, say, the concepts describing steady-state growth, supply factors, and expeduture-approach identities that one learns about in a college econ class.

If you don't know what I just said, I imagine much of this book will be opaque to you.

But if you can handle such stuff (and don't let me scare you too much: the gist of this book is clear enough even if you can't), man, O man! Olson's thesis is so brilliant it will give you whiplash!

In brief, great empires invariably collapse not because of cultural overstretch, internal discord, or military misfortune, but rather because the very process of building an empire gives rise to myriad vested interests that eventually claw their way so deeply into the neck of the government that they eventually choke it. In other words, empires collapse because they are invariably made sclerotic by special-interest groups.

An idea that is truly, classically brilliant: not obvious, but once developed at length, undeniable and endlessly applicable.

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The years since World War II have seen rapid shifts in the relative positions of different countries and regions. Leading political economist Mancur Olson offers a new and compelling theory to explain these shifts in fortune and then tests his theory against evidence from many periods of history and many parts on the world.

reviews: page 1, 2, 3

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